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Journal of Urban Affairs. vol 29 no 3,   2007 
 
‘BACK THE BID’: THE 2012 SUMMER OLYMPICS AND THE GOVERNANCE OF 
LONDON. 
 
Abstract:  The Olympic Park being developed in east London for the 2012 Games is one 
large urban renewal project among many in the city. The impact of the Games on urban 
development may be of less significance than the impact on city politics.  Bidding for and 
delivering the Games has contributed to a reassessment of the recent experiment with 
mayoral government.  The paper examines these changing representations of the structures 
of London government that are now seen as a success.  Much of the literature on Olympic 
cities is highly critical of the impact of the games, but the (current) substantial support for 
London2012 also needs to be explained. We examine how London has created opportunities 
for support, and moments and spaces for celebration when political leaders and Londoners 
can come together around particular representations of themselves and the city.   
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Once the decision was taken in May 2003 to compete for the 2012 Summer Games the 
slogan ‘Back the Bid’ filled billboards, posters on the sides of buses and was woven into the 
fabric of seats on the tube.  Opinion polls suggested consistent support for the campaign 
running at about 70%, and by May 2005 1.2m Londoners had signed up online to ‘Back the 
Bid’ and 10,000 had already volunteered to be helpers at the Games (The Londoner, May 
2005).  Experience from other recent Olympic cities and of other mega-events suggests 
tensions and conflicts to come as deadlines approach (Lenskyj 2002, Gursoy & Kendall 2006).  
Our focus in this paper is not on the delivery of the facilities for the Games or squabbles over 
the ‘legacy’ promoted by the London bid team but rather on the impacts of the decision to bid 
and the wining of the 2012 Games on the politics of the city.  The government of London can 
be seen as a ‘recurrent experiment’  (Pimlott & Rao, 2002).  National government may 
abolish the institutions of city government (as in 1986) or create new institutions (as in 1965 
and most recently in 2000).  The frequency of change suggests that national government 
sees the government of London as provisional.  The most recent ‘experiment’ is the 
establishment of mayoral government and the working out of new relationships between tiers 
of government and between government and Londoners. The decision to bid for the Games 
came just three years into the new system of mayoral government and, currently, relations 
between tiers of government are under review.  What were initially frosty relations between 
mayor and central government are changing and there has been a radical shift of opinion 
about the effectiveness of the government system.  The mayoral experiment is seen as a 
success and winning the Games gives a further boost to political leadership.  Whilst urban 
studies have given some attention to the role of leadership in city politics there is less 
understanding of moments when political leaders and followers can come together around 
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shared representations of the city. We examine how competing for the Olympic Games 
creates for moments for celebration and how the city creates spaces and opportunities for 
Londoners to show their support for the Olympic project and for the image of themselves 
represented in a global arena.  Both mayor and Prime Minister present an image of an 
Olympic London characterised by a harmonious racial and cultural diversity.   
 
Following success in Olympic competition on 6th July 2005 and the London bombings on 7th 
July the dominant image of London as host for the 2012 Games is as a city, ‘diverse and 
unafraid’ (GOL, 2006). We argue that bidding for and winning the 2012 Games has helped 
define the new system of London government and that through such moments different 
representations of city politics are (if only temporarily) clarified.  We start by locating the 
Olympic project in the context of large scale urban renewal in London.  In part two we move 
on to the governance of London looking firstly at institutional relationships and then at the 
dominant images of the city presented in the Olympic bid and at relationships between 
political leaders and Londoners.  The final part draws out significant issues for understanding 
the impacts of the Olympic Games on city politics.    
 
BIG PROJECTS IN THE TWICE OLYMPIC CITY 
 
For cities of the size of Barcelona or Atlanta the Olympics may have greater economic 
importance than for a large metropolitan area that is already a double Olympic city (1908, 
1948). Whilst large events are claimed to have image and tourism impacts the promotional 
agency VisitLondon estimates that London is already the most visited city globally. The large 
numbers of visitors expected to attend the 2012 Games will replace other tourists who will 
avoid London during this period.  The city is also used to big sporting occasions.  Half a 
million spectators watch the annual London marathon, the city is home to 6 Premier League 
football clubs, all with recently upgraded stadiums including the new 60,000 seat Arsenal 
stadium opened in July 2006. London hosts international rugby matches at Twickenham and 
international cricket at Lords and the Oval.  The city is used to managing big sports events 
and celebrations – victory parades after the rugby world cup win in 2003 and the cricket 
series against Australia in 2005. Whilst the 2012 Olympic Park presents a large infrastructure 
and development challenge this must also be viewed in the context of many other substantial 
projects taking shape in the city over the next 10-20 years.  There are large urban renewal 
projects underway in the central area at Paddington (23,000 jobs, 3,000 apartments, plus 
retail space and a hospital) in a new master plan for Victoria, at Kings Cross (2,000 
apartments, 25,000 office jobs), at Wembley (4,000 apartments, 6,000 office jobs, the 
national football stadium and a casino hotel ) and adjacent to the proposed Olympic park at 
Stratford City (4,500 apartments and 33,000 jobs in 5m sq ft of commercial space with a 
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2,000 bed hotel).  The Olympic Park is not the only large project and London, like New York 
(Fainstein, 2005), seems to have rediscovered a taste for large scale urban renewal.  An 
Olympic Park is just another project.  On the other hand such prestige projects have 
presented London with substantial problems in the recent past.  The proposed Picketts Lock 
athletics stadium was abandoned and London withdrew its bid for the 2005 World Athletics 
Championships.  The Millennium Dome was not ready on time and has since been an 
expensive white elephant.  Wembley Stadium is currently running about 2 years late 
(interestingly construction workers at the stadium were reported to have made money in 
betting against the project being ready on schedule (Butt, 2006)).  We might expect similar 
contractual issues around the delivery of Olympic facilities and around essential 
infrastructure.  In March 2006 the House of Commons Transport Committee  (HOC, 2006) 
expressed concern about the ‘pace’ of transport planning and found inconsistencies between 
the Interim Olympic Development Authority’s claim that the new shuttle trains would deliver 
25,000 passengers an hour and the railway companies’ own estimate of 12-14000.   
 
The Olympic Park is one urban renewal project among many underway in London over the 
next 10 or so years.  The early stages of planning for the Games reflect familiar approaches 
to big projects in London.  The large ‘destination Wembley’ project underway in the west of 
the city passed through similar phases.  The mayor lobbied powerful external players – the 
national Football Association, the government’s Department of Culture - to locate a new 
national football stadium at Wembley.  Once the decision to build was taken the local 
borough council negotiated with the FA and landowners over the local development gains and 
facilities that could be extracted the project.  For the proposed Olympic Park in the Lower Lea 
Valley in east London, once the Prime Minister has been persuaded by the mayor and others 
to authorise the bid the master plan was managed by a borough-led planning team.  The 
Olympic Development Authority established in March 2006 is a type of development 
corporation familiar in the East End through the redevelopment of London docklands.  This 
planning process has much in common with other London projects and is not the totally new 
approach to urban development politics seen in Athens and some other Olympic cities  
(Delladetsima 2004,86).  
 
The 2012 The Olympic Park in the Lower Lea Valley. 
 
The main Olympic venues are to be located in an Olympic Park and neighbouring areas 
largely in the borough of Newham in east London.  These parts of the city were identified as 
prospective Olympic sites in late 1970s when a bid for the 1988 Games was being considered.  
The mayor’s London Plan favours the east of the city over the west, encouraging new 
development to follow new public transport investment (GLA, 2004a).  The Borough of 
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Newham is the third most deprived borough in London, where life expectancy is the lowest. 
30% of the population defined itself as ‘white British’ in the 2001 census (Newham 2012 
Unit).  The Olympic bid was located in a discourse of regeneration and renewal of the East 
End with substantial claims in the bid documents about the legacy of jobs, homes, a new 
urban park and community facilities for this part of London (London2012, 2004a). The mayor 
does not want an ‘iconic’ stadium and after the games the main stadium will be reduced in 
scale to become a permanent athletics track.  Other performance spaces will either be 
dismantled or handed on to other users.  The network of walkways to and from transport and 
between facilities will be demolished and green space produced. The Olympic bid ‘liberates’ 
the space of the Lower Lea Valley from its industrial present and after the Games a new 
green landscape will emerge. 
 
Initial planning of the main Olympic sites in east London was undertaken by the Boroughs 
through a Joint Planning Authorities Team (JPAT) and the mayor’s economic development 
agency.  The boroughs organised extensive public consultation. Between August and 
December 2003 they held over 70 events to discuss urban regeneration plans (all of which 
assumed the Games would go ahead).  The JPAT won a Royal Town Planning Institute award 
in 2005 for their exemplary, participatory planning process.  Newham set up a new 
department to manage the negotiation of community benefits.   Other London boroughs have 
appointed staff briefed to exploit opportunities arising from the Games.  We might expect the 
branding of many local projects with an (unofficial) Olympic label exploiting the 
unaccustomed media focus on east London (LBWT, 2004). In February 2006 the Borough of 
Newham ran ‘The Big Sunday’ event that drew about 35,000 people to look over plans.  
 
Following success at the IOC meeting in Singapore the 2006 London Olympic Games and 
Paralympic Games Act set up the Olympic Development Authority with a leadership appointed 
by government (OPSI, 2006).  At the start of 2006 the master plan for the main Olympic site 
was revised.  The aim of the revision was to achieve better integration with the adjoining 
Stratford City Development, a large development located around the Stratford Eurostar 
station.  Part of the competitors’ accommodation and the Media Centre would be included in 
SCD.  Subsequently, further revisions moved the Media Centre to land nearby.  The revisions 
to the initial plans aimed reduce the land take of the Olympic project and displace fewer of 
the existing business on the sites (Interim Olympic Delivery Authority, 2006).  Closer 
integration with SCD offered planning benefits but relations between the IODA and SCD have 
not been smooth with the mayor blaming SCD shareholders for delays that could jeopardise 
the Olympic project (Muir, 2006).  On the up side the reduced land take cut by 95 the 
number of potential business objectors to the IODA’s compulsory purchase orders (CPO) on 
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land needed for the park. The public inquiry into the CPOs opened in May 2006 with 
government expected to confirm the orders by the end of the year (LDA, 2006).   
 
Displaced businesses, other displaced leisure users and environmental groups have been 
among the voices objecting to the bid and subsequent Olympic project in east London (LDA 
2006).  Critics of Olympic projects (see Lenskyj (2004, 137) on the Sydney experience,) 
suggest inevitable concerns about the diversion of public money, affordable housing not 
delivered, and the tax burden.  But in London these voices have been relatively low key. 
Some leisure uses have been displaced and not yet been offered acceptable alternative 
accommodation.  Environmental opposition has been mute.  The Lower Lea Valley consists of 
a network of rivers, open spaces, industrial uses and overhead power cables.  One debate on 
environmental impacts concluded that the valley was by no means picturesque and habitats 
not worth special protection (BBC, 2005).  Some opposition has been voiced to the cost of 
the Games and in particular the cost to London property taxpayers who began paying £625m 
from April 2006. For example, taxpayers in the borough of Barnet in north London will pay 
more than the ‘Olympic’ borough of Newham but receive no new sports facilities.  For some 
therefore the Games are seen as ‘the east London Olympics’ (This is Local London, 2006).  As 
in many other Olympic cities  (Lenskyj, 2004) taxpayers raise the issue of opportunity costs 
and current under provision of local sports facilities will not be made up by the facilities built 
for the Games (Self, 2006). But by far the loudest and most consistent opposition has come 
from displaced businesses.  350 businesses – from scrap metal to concrete recycling – are 
located along Marshgate Lane which runs through the proposed Olympic Park.  The mayor’s 
LDA proposed compensation or relocation packages. Those who refused offers were labelled 
by the mayor as a  ‘handful of greedy businessmen’ (Evening Standard, 2005). 
 
Criticism has been relatively mute and where critical questions have been raised they have 
been rebutted quickly. For example, an article drawing on the experience of the Manchester 
Commonwealth Games in 2002 to criticise claims about the legacy for local communities was 
rebutted within days by the leader of Manchester City Council (Leese, 2005).  The ODA, the 
Mayor and Government have been quick to dissociate the Olympic project from the failure of 
project management at Wembley.  Indeed the mayor’s dispute with SCD centred on contracts 
between the Stratford developers and Multiplex, the builders of the delayed Wembley 
stadium.  
 
THE CHANGING GOVERNANCE OF LONDON 
 
The Olympic Games of the past thirty years are located in debates about globalisation, about 
competition between nations, ideologies and cities, about place promotion and city image 
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building, about the imposition of IOC rules and militarisation of city spaces during the games, 
about local sports development and a global ‘sport-media-tourism complex’, and about 
opportunity costs (not least of taxation) and the lack of proper evaluation of costs and 
benefits, about the centralisation of decision making and a relaxation of planning processes – 
with reduced openness, accountability and participation, and the betrayal of the aspirations of 
those local communities upon which the location of the games has greatest impact (see for 
example, Baade & Matheson,2001, Bale & Christensen, 2004, Burbank, Andranovitch, and 
Heyning, 2001, Lenskyj, 2002, 2004, Maguire 2005b, Nauright, 2004, Preuss, 2000, Roche, 
2000, Short, 2004, Young and Wamsley, 2005).  Critics argue that the demands of the IOC 
dominate city politics and that local benefits are only gained through local activism.  
 
Studies of particular cities locate such broad themes in local political cultures but tend to 
emphasise the influence of business in pro-growth politics (for example in Los Angeles and 
Salt Lake City, Andranovitch et al 2001) and community impacts (for example in Sydney, 
Lenskyj, 2002).  We need to take a broader view of London government and politics. Olympic 
planning represents the government of London in particular ways. The Games have an 
important impact at a time when the institutions of government are being reassessed and 
reconfigured.  Initially in this part of the paper we review current institutional reforms and 
then go on to examine political leadership and how leaders represent Londoners in the 
Olympic debate.  In Olympic planning we can see the new institution of the mayor in action 
and a distinctive style of city governance emerging.  
 
The history of London government is one of changing institutions (Innwood, 2005, Travers, 
2004) and ‘recurrent experiment’ (Pimlott & Rao, 2002). In recent years experiment has been 
characterised by the effects of a fragmentation of responsibilities (among London Boroughs, 
government sponsored neighbourhood renewal initiatives, local business and public-private 
sector lobbies) and of the controlling hand of central government (Newman and Thornley, 
1997).  In 2000 the Greater London Authority and directly elected city-wide mayor and were 
added to an already complex institutional landscape of governance.  In the ‘new’ government 
of London the London Boroughs created in the 1960s retain their comprehensive service 
delivery and planning functions.  Private sector lobbies that have developed over the past 
twenty years remain influential. And despite creating a mayor, central government retained 
the office of Minister for London.  Initially the new London government was regarded as a 
‘weak mayor’ model (Newman, 2000, Pimlott & Rao, 2002, Travers, 2004).  However, just a 
few years on from the reform of 2000, the role of the mayor is changing again and we can 
see this as another reworking of the ‘recurrent experiment’.  The current readjustment of 
London governance needs to be seen in the context of the management of the Games. 
Bidding for the Games is a choice for national elites.  Once the decision is made the city has 
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to accept the Olympic package – delivery of facilities, control of the brand.  In the centralised 
British state the decision to bid was taken by central government, after substantial 
encouragement from the mayor of London.  But the mayor in his own right is a signatory of 
the Olympic contract and this act implies readjustment of relationships. The Games give the 
mayor a world stage to promote the city and his own personal role in governing the city. 
Prime Minister and mayor share leadership roles.   
 
In defining ‘London’s Challenge’ moving towards 2012 the government says of local 
government  
 
‘The Mayor and Assembly have provided a highly successful model of city governance.’  (GOL, 
2006,45) 
and, 
‘The boroughs will remain pivotal for the many local public services that matter to people. 
They provide strong local leadership…’  (46) 
 
Government presents a positive image of the formal structures of government.  But these 
views are very different from the perspective on London government expressed by the Prime 
Minister’s Strategy Unit two years earlier,  
 
(London ) ‘has a complex system of governance that does not easily enable the city to focus 
on its strategic needs’  (Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit 2004). 
 
At that time the business lobby London First also focused on leadership and strategy making 
in asking, ‘Who is Responsible for London?’ (London First, 2004).  But representing the 
governance of London positively has become important for the Olympic project both for the 
bidding process and subsequently for relationships with the agencies that will deliver the 
Olympics facilities and infrastructure. We need to see this Olympic imperative alongside other 
important factors creating new views of London government.  
 
A government review of the powers of the mayor was launched in 2005 (ODPM,2005).  In 
the 2000 election Ken Livingstone stood as an independent candidate against the Labour 
Party.  The popularity of the mayor during his first term led to his being encouraged to rejoin 
the Labour Party.  Livingstone was welcomed back in January 2004 with the Prime Minister 
arguing that it was ‘very, very important’ that they work together in particular on the Olympic 
bid  (Guardian, 2004). After his re-election in 2004, now as a Labour Party candidate, the 
mayor negotiated enhanced powers.  The government review consequently proposed new 
relationships both between the mayor and central government and the mayor and borough 
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councils with the mayor’s powers increasing across a range of functions including strategic 
planning.  Coincident with this shift in intergovernmental relations the Olympic bid required 
the active involvement of the mayor’s economic development agency (the London 
Development Agency, LDA) to begin the process of planning and acquiring land for the 
Olympic Park.  Once the 2012 games were awarded to London the Olympic Games Act 
recognised the importance of the mayor’s obligations under the Host City Contract in 
allocating powers to the ODA and other agencies (OPSI, 2006).  The ‘weak’ mayor identified 
in 2000 whose power resided largely in ‘influence’ (Travers, 2004) now has substantial 
authority over large scale urban renewal and a powerful relationship in relation to the 
providers of infrastructure needed for the games.  The GLA and mayor move from being 
relatively weak institutions towards something like the ‘Government as Promoter’ that 
characterised a period of government-led planning in New York in which the power of 
development agencies expanded around a narrow policy consensus (Kantor, 2002). In 
addition to his positional power the mayor could also express strong (not to say offensive) 
personal views about a ‘handful of greedy businessmen’ in the way of the Olympic Park and 
about partners in the Stratford City Development who should, ‘go back to Iran and try their 
luck with the ayatollahs’ (quoted in Muir, 2006).  The realignment of powers, the new 
perspective on ‘highly successful’ mayoral government and leadership of the Olympic 
development and East End regeneration project offer opportunities to a populist mayor.   
 
Whilst businesses located around the Olympic park may establish new relationships (for 
better or worse) with the mayor, the process of bidding for the Games continues well-worn 
roles for ‘big business’ in the government of London.  Regional utilities, airlines and hotel 
chains were drawn, with encouragement of government, into the boosterist London First 
organisation in the early 1990s (Newman & Thornley, 1997). This corporate involvement in 
London government continued through the 1990s and London-wide business interests 
established regular contact with the new mayor in 2000 (Newman & Thornley, 2005, 142-
143).  Business with London-wide interests – the utility companies, EDF Energy and BT, the 
airlines, British Airways and Virgin Atlantic, and the management consultants, Accenture - 
became ‘Premier Partners’ of the Olympic Bid Committee (London2012, 2004b).  Construction 
companies represented through the British Property Federation lobbied the ODA for a ‘legacy 
strategy’ that would secure the infrastructure for development around the Olympic Park after 
the Games (Planning, 2006).  
  
Relationships between government and business follow lines developed in the early 1990s.  
However, planning of the Games reconfigures relationships between the tiers of government.  
Government and mayor share leadership of the Olympic project, and the mayor’s role in 
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relation to other tiers of government has been enhanced. In the next section we examine 
how Londoners respond to the new government of the city.  
 
Popular support for the Games 
 
Political leaders relate to their followers through persuasion, offering inducements, 
anticipating responses, and making emotional appeals.  Most important in this relationship is 
for leaders to gratify the motives of followers (Stone, 1995, reviewing Burns, 1978).  The 
Olympic bidding process offers political leaders at least a medium term horizon and an 
international arena in which to represent the aspirations, motivations, and qualities of the 
public.  Throughout the bidding period there was substantial support for the London Games.  
Critics of the Olympics tend to see such support as illusory,  
 
‘The Olympic industry has the power to suppress local dissent and to promote the illusion of 
unequivocal support on the part of host cities and countries;’ (Lenskyj, 2004, 152). 
 
It may be a mistake to dismiss the ‘illusion of support’.  At the end of Wamlsey’s critical 
review of the notion of Olympism the author says, 
 
‘But people love it, participants, coaches, parents and spectators alike, now more than ever’  
(2004, 240). 
 
At some future time supporters of London2012 may recant, but for the present it is this 
support rather than limited opposition that needs to be explained.  Support for large public 
events can be underplayed as was the case with the Millennium Dome in east London where 
political and media criticism drowned out the consistent evidence of public enjoyment of the 
Dome as a temporary visitor attraction (McGuigan, 2003).  The London Olympic bid 
committee consistently claimed high levels of support and the crowds gathered in Trafalgar 
Square on 6th July 2006 to hear the decision on which city would win the 2012 Games gave 
voice to this support.  Whilst the leadership side of leader-follower relationships is relatively 
well understood (for example, Mollenkopf, 1992, Stone, 1995, Judd, 2000, Le Galès, 2002), 
there has been much less consideration of followers and of how the city creates opportunities 
for leader-follower relationships to be consummated.  To better understand such moments of 
popular support we draw on some insights from the sociology of events and sport.   
 
The Games can be seen as a great public ritual that has importance and meaning for political 
leaders and public alike. According to Roche (2000) elites connect with liberal visions of multi-
culturalism and environmentalism and project these periodically in mass festivals. For political 
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leaders such events help display both a mission and global destiny (2000,10).  They have an 
external audience but also an internal one through the provision of extra-ordinary events that 
give meaning to spaces in cities and help define the roles of citizens.  The Olympic events 
offer,  ‘major medium-term political, cultural and economic projects for cities and nations’, 
and for individuals, ‘dramatic lived experiences’ (Roche, 2000,13).  Linking individual 
experience to mega-projects suggests a way of understanding support for the London bid 
and how that support connects with political leaders’ interpretations of the value of the 
Games.  
 
The timetable of bidding for and winning the Games offers moments for celebration. London 
offers places suitable for such celebrations.  Drawing on Elias’ (1997) notion of the ‘civilising 
process’, Maguire (2005a) points out that organised games were an important feature of 
imperial history and he uses the idea of ‘zones of prestige’ to signify places where, ‘culturally 
impressive activities are produced, displayed and consumed’ (2005a, 16).  Over the years 
withdrawal from empire and defeat in competition undermines prestige, but London still 
retains some ‘culturally impressive’ institutions and spaces.  In the centre of the city Trafalgar 
Square has developed over two centuries as a place of public gathering, national celebrations 
(and popular uprisings). The mayor of London has overseen a £25m package of physical 
improvements of Trafalgar Square.  The square is animated with almost continuous festivals 
and is an important feature in the mayor’s cultural strategy (GLA,2004b).  The square 
accommodates moments of celebration and shared cultural experience and links an imperial 
past to the contemporary city.  The use of public celebrations and festivals to ‘imagineer’ 
spaces for visitors (Hughes, 1999) is well documented but cities also offer special places and 
special moments in which residents can see history made before their eyes and where 
cultural values can be reproduced.  According to the mayor’s opinion polls, 80% of Londoners 
support the organisation of, ‘events that celebrate London and its diverse communities’ 
(Livingstone, 2006a).  On 6th July 2005 the 2012 Games were awarded to London and 
11,000 people celebrated in Trafalgar Square in front of 2 giant television screens. The 
message of ‘patriotism and pop’ (Guardian 2005a) promoted a particular vision of national 
and urban qualities that were simultaneously being presented to the IOC in Singapore.  The 
event was, 
 
‘Brilliant for modern London as a whole, for which the Olympics will provide a thrilling 
validation and climax to its 21st-century re-emergence as an open, multiracial and dynamic 
world city’  (Guardian, 2005b). 
 
The core message was repeated in Tony Blair’s address to the crowd, 
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“London is an open, multi-racial, multi-religious, multicultural city and rather proud of it. 
People of all races and nationalities mix in with each other and mix in with each other well."  
(Guardian, 2005c) 
 
Such celebratory moments offer an opportunity for ‘national reassessment’  of ‘Britain’s sense 
of itself and of its relation to the world’  (Philips, 2004, 107). This particular image of 
London’s qualities and of the motivations of Londoners is important in contemporary debate 
about the East End of London.  In their review of the impacts of public policy in east London 
Dench et al (2005) identify a rediscovery of imperial ‘tolerance’ in the middle class 
cosmopolitanism that underpins government’s approach to managing this part of the city.  In 
the East End the state has used a new cosmopolitan ideology to, ‘govern a diverse 
population’ (2005,226) and to define a national sense of a new place in the world (2005,226).  
Multiculturalism,  ‘now serves as Britain’s distinctive rationale in the current world order, and 
in many respects can be considered a success’ (2005, 226).  What links political leaders and 
public in Trafalgar Square and in wider support for the London Olympics is a particular idea of 
London’s place in the world.  We can see in the Olympic project an approach to governing 
the city in tune with contemporary political ideology.  For Londoners the games offer, ‘special 
opportunities to participate in collective projects’  (Roche, 2000, 222) and in the revalorised 
Trafalgar Square ‘zone of prestige’ individuals can connect with political leaders and connect 
success in international competition with national ideology.    
This moment of affirmation between Londoners and political leaders may of course be short-
lived. Research on mega events suggests that support may wane after the games as 
residents realise that, in particular, economic gains are less than expected (Gursoy & Kendall, 
2006).  Ideological claims may be contested. For example, political leaders interpreted the 
French victory in the 1998 World Cup as evidence of a racially integrated France whereas 
others saw the ‘black, blanc, beur’ football team as barely concealing the racism endemic in 
public policy (Burgel, 2006, 145).   
The multiculturalism of the London bid was challenged on the day after the celebration of 
winning the games.  In Singapore the mayor had stressed security – picking two of his three 
adjectives -  
‘I know that what you want from me is to take whatever measures are necessary to deliver a 
safe, secure and superb Games.’ (Livingstone 2005) 
After the London bombings on 7th July, Tony Blair, reflecting on his presentation to the IOC in 
Singapore, said, 
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‘that was a story of a city that was comfortable with the future, open, actually believed its 
diversity was a source of richness and strength, and was kind of confident and unafraid.‘ 
(Blair, 2006). 
This response to fear comes as a new motivation for Londoners adding to the belief in 
diversity.  Mayor Livingstone found support for this view in his survey of attitudes six months 
after the bombings, 
 
‘After those terrible events, what the poll showed was that Londoners were more confident 
about their city, more happy with the diversity of their city, and also less fearful of crime on 
our streets. In every measure people were more confident.’  (Livingstone, 2006b). 
 
Londoners are ‘confident’ and ‘happy with diversity’. In Singapore it was not sport but this 
emphasis on multiculturalism that swung votes (Livingstone, 2006b).  This ‘banal 
cosmopolitanism’  (Beck, 2006), taking children from the East End to present the London bid 
in Singapore and getting Nelson Mandela to endorse the bid, ties in with the wider ideology 
identified in the government of a multi-cultural city (Dench et al., 2005).  
 
We should not overstate the political significance of such celebratory moments.  However, for 
the losers on 6th July 2005 equally fundamental issues of political culture seemed to be at 
stake.  London’s celebration in Trafalgar Square was watched on giant screens by a matching 
group of Olympic hopefuls gathered outside the Hotel de Ville (zone of prestige) in Paris.  In 
the French press defeat was, ‘a triumph of British "dynamism" over an "unattractive" French 
model, and a country struggling with its identity in the face of globalisation’  (BBC news 
online, 2005). The Parisien newspaper summed up the opposition,  
 
‘This Britain, which is in disgustingly good economic health, which advocates economic 
liberalism and plays the globalisation and competition game all the way, is more attractive 
than a France which looks back nostalgically to its past grandeur.’  (BBC news online, 2005). 
 
The French media interpreted the result in Singapore as symptomatic of an old city, a 
damaged zone of prestige. The British bid leader said as much, ‘No one doubted that Paris 
could put on a good Games, but many of the (IOC) voters had seen it all before’ (Coe, 2005).  
The riots in Paris suburbs in November 2005 became included in an interpretation of the 
failure of the ‘French model’ in a national political commentary about social malaise and a 
‘fearful’ middle class (Donzelot, 2005).  The French bid, unlike that for the 2008 Games, was 
also seen to have done little to reach into the (deprived) wider region as London had done in 
the East End. The Olympic failure was one factor among many seen to be contributing to 
social division.  
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Such moments are clearly important for city politics.  In London the changing institutions of 
this phase of the ‘recurrent experiment’ of government create a role for political leaders to 
represent the city and the Olympic Games timetable offers moments at which leaders can 
connect with followers.  In victory the idea of a multicultural London elicits a positive 
response, but in Paris all urban policy seems to be undermined by some fundamental cultural 
malaise.  In fact the causes of riots in suburban France may owe more to inept policy 
decisions than cultural failure (Pinson, 2006).  And the reason for success and failure in 
Olympic competition may be readily explained by the IOC’s obscure voting system, or, as the 
mayor of Paris claimed, by the British not sticking to the rules  (Glover, 2005).  After the 
decision in Singapore it was widely reported that some members of the IOC didn’t know how 
they had voted and the vote could have gone any of several ways. But however the decision 
about winning and losing was arrived at, the interpretation of success and failure is important 
for the ability of political leaders to define relationships with their followers.   
London is represented as a diverse and unafraid city.  Londoners for the time being remain 
enthusiastic.  There are,  
‘70,000 volunteers from all sorts of different walks of life, and the sense of unity for the city 
that gives is something quite remarkable.’  (Blair, 2006). 
As the Games approach Londoners may become more concerned with the issues raised in 
other cities – rising costs, conflict over corporate branding, the inconvenience of Olympic 
security and disruption to transport and struggles over the legacy and who gets what 
(Lenskyj, 2002). For the present political leaders claim consensus and represent Londoners in 
particular ways that link the approach to urban renewal in the East End to a sense of national 
mission and sense that Londoners have of being ‘confident’ and ‘happy with diversity’.  In the 
‘recurrent experiment’ of London government the Olympic Games offer the new leadership 
the opportunity to present and have confirmed its view of the city.   
 
LONDON 2012: BUILDING ON SUCCESS 
 
For most Olympic cities bidding and planning involves national governments. Nowhere more 
so that in the centralised British state where the decision to bid rested with the Prime Minister 
and where government defines the legislation governing the Games, appointment of the 
leaders of delivery agencies and determines the transport infrastructure budget.  But the 
mayor is also a powerful player as the governance of the city is represented in new ways.  
The perception of the institutions of government is important and new political leadership 
offers particular representations of London as an Olympic city.  
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Political leadership and city image have been important factors in other Olympic cities.  City 
mayors, Maragall in Barcelona, Drapeau in Montreal, saw the potential role for the Olympics 
in redefining local identity (Marshall, 2000, Whitson, 2004) and a role for the Games in the 
longer term transformation of their cities.  The mayor of London takes a similar view.  In the 
Barcelona case in particular we might also see the importance of popular support in 
sustaining the mayor’s vision (McNeill, 1999).   
 
Urban renewal in London has always involved a mix of national and local programmes and 
agencies.  In recent years substantial national investment in London docklands has been 
accompanied by numerous government-funded neighbourhood renewal initiatives.  The new 
mayor prioritised the East End in his strategic plan (GLA, 2004a), lobbying government for 
essential transport investment.  For both mayor and central government an East End 
Olympics that brings wider regeneration potential reinforces established policy priorities. The 
reshaping of the East End is not just a process of physical renewal but is important in the 
racial politics of the city.  The Olympic borough of Newham has a majority non-white 
population.  British public policy has accommodated new populations over four decades 
through a politics of ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘tolerance’ (Dench et al., 2005).  Not surprisingly it 
is this image of London that political leaders represent in the Olympic bid and reinforce in the 
victory celebration in Trafalgar Square.  The 11,000 Londoners in Trafalgar Square and the 
wider audience reached by the media responded positively to the image of themselves as 
‘open, multiracial and dynamic’.  The Olympic Borough of Newham’s surveys (Newham 2012, 
2005) suggest continuing local support especially with the prospect of enhanced local 
facilities and other planning gains.  Whether East Enders would go to the Games is another 
question. As is who they might support in Olympic competitions. British Asians are more likely 
to support the England football team than they are the cricket team (Burdsey, 2006), and for 
the most popular sport in London surveys suggest that football loyalities have more to do 
with club than with country (King, 2005). If East Enders were to go to the Olympic Games it 
may be to support many different national teams. 
 
The ideology of multiculturalism and tolerance was tested by the London bombings in July 
2005, but according to the mayor’s surveys of opinion, ‘diversity’ and ‘confidence’ remain 
defining qualities of the population (Livingstone,2006b).  Such celebratory occasions for the 
city as that in Trafalgar Square offer more than a ‘feel good’ factor and we can see them as 
‘dramatic lived experiences’ shaping identities and reproducing the zones of prestige of the 
city. The mayor’s investment in Trafalgar Square pays off at such moments when political 
leaders can connect with their followers.  In London, bidding for and planning for the 
Olympics comes at a time when the institutions of government were under review.  The need 
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to represent London to an international audience brought about a revision of opinions on 
London government held just two year’s earlier.  From a city unable to focus on ‘its strategic 
needs’, government is now ‘highly successful’.  The path to 2012 is presented as an 
opportunity to ‘build on success’ (GOL, 2006).  As we have seen, political relationships 
between mayor and central government have been changing.  The mayor demanded a 
stronger role in strategic decision making. At the same time the mayor became an essential 
player in delivering the Olympic Games.  The mayor is seen as a leader of the Olympic project 
and as a popular leader representing the public interest against ‘greedy businessmen’.  
Institutional reform and the Olympic bidding and planning process enhance the personal 
power of the mayor. Mayor Livingstone and the Prime Minister share the Olympic stage and 
opportunities to represent Londoners to the world with a vision of city governance and 
politics aimed to last for 6 years.   
 
The Olympic park is one of many large projects in London.  The scale and pace of urban 
renewal in east London is estimated to be driving up construction costs, and the final Olympic 
bill may well exceed estimates.  But more significant than the physical impact of the Games 
are the distinctive impacts on institutions of governance.  Bidding for the Olympic Games is 
well understood in terms of urban strategies that favour economic development, consumption 
and image (Burbank et al., 2001).  In some cities it may be question of business as usual for 
pro-growth regimes.  For London, where the Olympic Park is one project among many, 
tracing the politics of development politics may tell us less about the significance of the 
Olympics for the city.  What seems more important is the wider political impact and the need 
to understand how political leaders claim support and Londoners ‘back the bid’.  Explaining 
support for the Games has had less attention in the Olympic literature than understanding 
opposition. The sociology of sport and events offers useful insights into the role of public 
rituals and celebrations in making sense of competing for the Games for both political leaders 
and the public.  Cities such as London provide zones of prestige where through dramatic 
experiences such interaction can be developed, political messages transmitted and 
relationships between political leaders and Londoners confirmed (if only temporarily).   
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